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Abstract
In most industrialized countries, more people than ever are having to cope with
the burden of caring for elderly parents. This paper formulates a model to explain
how parental care responsibilities and family structure interact in affecting children’s
mobility characteristics. A key insight we obtain is that the mobility of young adults
crucially depends on the presence of a sibling. Our explanation is mainly, but not ex-
clusively, based on a sibling power effect. Siblings compete in location and employment
decisions so as to direct parental care decisions at later stages towards their preferred
outcome. Only children are not exposed to this kind of competition. This causes an
equilibrium in which siblings not only exhibit higher mobility than only children, but
also have better labor market outcomes. Using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP) and from the American National Survey of Families and House-
holds (NSFH), we find strong evidence that confirms these patterns. The implications
of our results are then discussed in the context of current population trends in Europe
and the United States.
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“Say you were an assistant bank manager, in Guildford. And you’d be thinking of
emigrating, and then you were offered the job of managing a bank in Sydney. You
might sit down with a bit of paper and draw up a list of pros and cons. You know:
CONS – aged parents, friends, golf club.
PROS – more money, better quality of life, sea, sunshine, etc.
It’s no contest, is it?”
Nick Hornby, A Long Way Down, 2005
1. Introduction
Standard economic theory holds that geographic mobility plays a key role in the function-
ing of the market mechanism by ensuring a smooth transfer of labor out of contracting
locations and into expanding ones. Yet, in practice, it is the lack of geographic mobility
that is a recurrent source of concern – in particular in the European context.1 A commonly
held view is that low geographic mobility can be attributed to a combination of high aggre-
gate unemployment, intrinsic preferences against mobility and policy-induced distortions.2
But of all the factors said to affect geographic mobility, the one which has received little
attention from economists are familial obligations such as adult children’s caring for aged
parents. Today, more adult children than ever before are having to cope with the burden
of caring for elderly parents. Such caregiving is time consuming, taking an average of 20
hours per week (National Alliance for Caregiving [2004]), and geographic proximity be-
tween the caregiver and the care recipient is a key factor that helps the caregiver cope with
elder care responsibilities (Stern [1995]). Against this background, this paper investigates
how parental care responsibilities and family structure interact in affecting adult children’s
mobility patterns.
Imagine you are a young adult living in the same home or locality as your parents. After
having finished your general education, a choice you may have to consider is a residential
move in order to get a job in a distant labor market where the potential for increased
life-time earnings exists. There are, however, costs associated with the decision to move
that must be weighed against the expected gains. A residential move may cause problems
in the future for those social relationships that require face to face contact: in particular,
you may have to adjust future time allocations to meet the social and physical needs of
your aged parents. What determines the propensity that you will eventually move away
from your home region?
1Indeed, many people in Europe do not move very far over their lifespan. For example, in the United
Kingdom approximately 44 percent of the population live within the local authority in which they were
born (Gregg et al. [2004]). The lack of mobility is particularly notable in Germany, where approximately
59 percent of the population live in the town of their childhood. We have used SOEP data from 2002 to
compute this figures.
2These last include in particular centralized wage agreements (Tatsiramos [2004], Braunerhjelm et al.
[2000]), high unemployment benefits (Antolin and Bover [1997], Bertola [1999], Nickell and Layard [1999])
and regional housing policies (Oswald [1997]).
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We start with the idea that family-related factors might affect the mobility pattern of
young adults through three different channels. First, parental characteristics such as age
affect mobility: the more likely it is that a parent needs a substantial amount of attention
or care in the near future, the lower the probability that a young adult moves out of
the home region.3 Second, the presence of an alternative potential caregiver such as a
sibling affects mobility: only children, unlike siblings, make decisions unaffected by various
externalities that siblings introduce into each other’s environment. Third, the probability
that a given young adult becomes a mover is higher if that person grows up in a region
with low employment prospects.
In this paper we address these ideas both theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical
model consists of a two-period game in which the players are two adult siblings. In the
first period, the children decide non-cooperatively on where to live and where to seek
employment. In the second period, as parents age or experience declines in health, they
require attention and care. These life cycle events place demands upon their children. We
model the impact of family caregiving on adult children in the context of a model that
recognizes not only several competing uses of time, but also the possibility of strategic
interactions among adult siblings when making care decisions. The “caregiving game”
which is the focus of our analysis captures a process of bargaining through which adult
siblings take turns offering more or less help according to their parents’ shifting needs and
their variable ability to offer such support.
Our analysis shows several interesting results. As a benchmark, we first characterize
the location and employment decisions of an only child conditional on his or her long-term
family caregiving responsibilities. We then analyze the process of bargaining through which
siblings try to figure out ways of sharing the responsibility for their parents. Bargaining
power is inextricably bound up in this process. We show that a caregiving equilibrium exists
in which the balance of power is on the side of the child who has “economic status”. More
precisely, the child who has a higher wage income and lives further away from the parents
has a bargaining power advantage, and hence provides a smaller share of the required
amount of care. Finally, we turn our attention to the siblings’ equilibrium location decisions.
A key insight we obtain is that the location choices of siblings interact with family care
decisions at later stages so as to cause an equilibrium in which siblings systematically
exhibit higher rates of mobility than only children: they are more likely to become movers
if a potential for increased earnings opportunities outside the parents’ location exists.
Our analysis shows that the intuition for this result can be decomposed into two effects:
a sibling power effect and a resource constraint effect. The sibling power effect comes from
3There exists a strong gerontological basis for this hypothesis. For example, a 30 year old child with a
50 year old parent faces a 23 percent risk that the parent will fall victim to long-term illness within the
next 5 years. In contrast, a 30 year old child with a 60 year old parent is exposed to a 39 percent risk that
the parent suffers from a long-term illness within the next 5 years. These numbers are based on a healthy
life expectancy study for Scotland (Clark et al. [2004], p. 45).
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noting that the traditional determinants of status in society – wage, income, or occupational
status – place adult siblings in a stronger position to direct care decisions within the family
towards their preferred outcome. This, in turn, translates into incentives for both siblings to
move to where high-valued employments are. In fact, it is as if siblings compete in location
and employment decisions so as to affect “who’s got the say” in family care decisions at
later stages. Hence the power structure between adult siblings has a determinate effect on
their mobility pattern.
The explanation for the resource constraint effect is as follows. The fact that siblings
may actually negotiate ways of sharing the responsibility for the care of their parents implies
that any given sibling spends less time helping the parents than an only child, at least at the
margin. The equilibrium location and employment decisions of adult siblings subsume this
positive externality in a rational manner: anticipating lower parental care costs associated
with a residential move, siblings are more likely to respond to better earnings opportunities
outside the parents’ home location by becoming movers.
We test our predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP) and the American National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). Chil-
dren with a sibling exhibit statistically significant higher rates of geographical mobility
than only children. Consistent with our model, this pattern is especially prevalent in re-
gions with low employment prospects. We demonstrate that these results are driven by
the mechanisms highlighted in the theoretical model. We also find strong support for the
hypothesis that, due to higher mobility, children with a sibling have better labor market
outcomes. For example, siblings who grow up in economically deprived regions have around
10 percent higher labor earnings than only children from economically comparable regions.
Similarly, siblings have a 10 percent higher chance of being in full-time employment and
are less likely to be unemployed and economically inactive.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 lays
down our theoretical model. Section 4 characterizes the location and employment decisions
of an only child. Section 5 derives the main results concerning the mobility pattern of
siblings. Section 6 describes the data and confronts the theoretical results with empirical
evidence. Section 7 discusses the implications of our findings in the context of current
population trends in Europe and the United States. Section 8 presents conclusions. All
technical proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Related Literature.
The approach presented in this paper builds on two important microeconomic perspectives:
(1) that adult children make decisions relative to parental care responsibilities long before
the actual care is needed (Stern [1995]); and (2) that strategic interactions between siblings
have a determinate effect on their mobility pattern (Konrad et al. [2002]).
Konrad et al. [2002] have recently developed a very interesting model that seeks an
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understanding of the mobility pattern of siblings in terms of a birth order effect. They
argue that in families with two children, location choice has a strategic commitment value
if it is made before actual caregiving occurs. In particular, they show that firstborn children
may strategically choose to locate in some distance from their parents, essentially forcing
second born children into staying closer to the parents and providing all of the caregiving in
the future. The authors also report empirical evidence that suggests that firstborn siblings
locate further away from their parents than second born siblings and only children.
From our point of view, the birth order effect highlighted in Konrad et al. [2002] is just
one among many strategic elements that siblings introduce into each other’s environment.
This paper seeks an understanding of siblings in terms of power relationships, rather than in
terms of birth order effects. We use the term “power relationship” to refer to the influence
and relative bargaining power each sibling has within the family. The emphasis of this
study is on the association between siblings’ location and employment decisions and their
subsequent ability to control decision-making within the family. Our main message is that
the strategic influence of siblings on one another is more important that than the strategic
influence of firstborn on second born siblings. In other words, the very presence of a sibling
matters a lot more than birth order.
Stern [1995] also considers family decision-making in the context of a two-stage game.
In the first stage, prior to the parents needing care, each family member makes decisions
such as where to live, where to work, and whether to marry. In the second stage, the fam-
ily jointly chooses a care arrangement. Stern [1995] addresses the fundamental question
of whether or not family members act strategically in the first stage. In doing so, he pro-
vides some evidence that supports the hypothesis that family members take into account
how first stage decisions affect second stage outcomes. Our empirical analysis consider-
ably strengthens this evidence that young adults make decisions relative to long-term care
decisions long before the actual care is needed.
3. The Model
3.1. The Environment. We envision an environment in which a “linear economy” of
length ∆ ≡ x− x lies on the abscissa of a line. The economy is populated by a family that
consists of parents p and two children: child f who is born first, and child s who is born
second. Parents p are located at one extreme of the economy. More precisely, they live
and raise their children at x = x. There are two labor markets which are located at the
extremes of the economy: a local labor market is situated at x = x, while a distant labor
market is at x = x. Our model consists of a two period situation.
• Period 1: The “Location” Game. When f and s are young adults, they noncoopera-
tively decide on where to live and where to seek employment. The former decision will be
referred to as a location choice, while the latter will be referred to as an employment choice.
We assume that child f makes her employment and location choice first, which should be
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true in practice because she is older (Konrad et al. [2002]). The location choices are points
lf ∈ [x, x] and ls ∈ [x, x]. The employment choices are binary actions ef ∈ {x, x} and
es ∈ {x, x}. We interpret the action ei = x as i’s (i = f, s) decision to become employed
in the local labor market, while the action ei = x should be thought of as i’s decision to
become employed in the distant labor market. A benefit function wi : ei → R represents
the impact of the employment choice on future earnings potentials:
Assumption 1 (Opportunities at different job locations) For each i ∈ {f, s}, let
wi ≡


w if ei = x
w if ei = x
where w ≥ w.
Our basic notion here is that job prospects and earning opportunities in the distant labor
market may be better than in the parents’ home location. For example, unemployment
rates in the local labor market may be high and jobs may be more unstable due to declining
industries in the region.
One would expect that low earnings prospects in the home region should increase the net
benefits of moving and push individuals away to higher-valued employments. But various
factors besides the expected earnings differential influence the decision to become a mover.
These determinants of geographic mobility include in particular the family background.
• Period 2: The “Caregiving Game”. As parents retire and their social circle of friends
and relatives begins to shrink, children become socially more important to them. Common
events at this point of the parents’ life cycle (such as the loss of a spouse, a long-standing
illness or a disability) further heightens the elderly’s dependence. It is well understood
that adult children respond to the circumstances and shifting needs of their parents. For
example, having a parent in poor health typically leads to a significant increase in time
inputs of adult children devoted to parents. We now turn to an assumption which is
intended to capture these issues.
At the beginning of period 2, a state of nature – referred to as parental needs status k
– is realized that determines the amount of care (or assistance) that parents require. The
state of parental needs is assumed to be binary, either high (k = h) with Pr(k = h) = ρ or
low (k = l) with Pr(k = l) = 1 − ρ. We adopt the convention to refer to the state k = h
as “parental dependency” and to the state k = l as “parental independency”. Accordingly,
Pr(k = h) = ρ will be sometimes referred to as a measure of expected parental dependency.
The term “parental dependency” is to be understood in a wide sense. It refers to family
circumstances such as the death of one parent or a close relative, parental divorce, or a
limiting long-standing illness or disability. The difference between the two states is best
captured in the distinction between “caring for” and “caring about” a family member.
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Assumption 2 (“Caring for” parents) Let gh denote the amount of care visits that parents
require in the realization k = h. If the siblings reach an agreement on how to provide the
required amount of care, each child i (i = f, s) derives utility Gh from the fact that parental
needs are satisfied.
We would like to elaborate on this. The need for care and assistance by parents may
generate interesting interactions among adult siblings, as they might seek ways of jointly
providing the required support to their parents.4,5 Indeed, sociologists have long emphasized
that it is common for siblings to engage in a process of bargaining through which they take
turns offering more or less help according to shifting needs of parents and their variable
ability to offer. The bargaining game which will be the focus of our analysis captures
a situation in which a fixed number of care units gh is required to meet the parents’
requirements of the situation, and player f and player s propose to respectively contribute
shf and s
h
s care units to the required amount of care.
6 The precise structure of the bargaining
protocol will be specified in later sections.
The above assumption concerns the state of parental dependency which involves a public
good game between those implicated in providing eldercare. What about ties between
parents and children in the state of parental independency? With the parents’ capacity to
deal with self-care intact, caregiving is no longer motivated by parental needs. However,
each child will privately need to put in a positive (but potentially small) amount of effort
to maintain a valuable parent-child relationship.
Assumption 3 (“Caring about” parents) Let gl denote the minimum number of face-to-
face contacts each child i (i = f, s) is required to make to derive private benefits Gl from
the parent-child relationship in the realization k = l.
With these preliminaries in hand, we now turn to the payoff consequences of parent-care.
3.2. Assumptions on the Payoff Consequences of Parent-Care. Empirical research
has shown that adult children appear to respond to the circumstances of their parents, and
that the form of response is strongly influenced by economic considerations, particularly
the opportunity cost of time, as measured by the market wage rate (Couch et al. [1999]).
Moreover, it is well understood that working-age adults may support their parents by re-
ducing work hours, using vacation and sick days for parent care, giving up opportunities
for job advancement or forfeiting leisure time. These findings suggest to investigate the
4Note that we only consider time inputs provided to elderly parents and not monetary transfers from
adult children to their parents. This is a realistic scenario. Szydlik [2000] reports that in Germany less than
4 percent of children aged between 40-85 years make financial transfers to their parents in a given year.
5The caregiving assistance that is required may involve help with instrumental activities of daily living
(such as managing medications, transporting the elder to various appointments, shopping, or housekeeping)
and help with activities of daily living (such as bathing, dressing or eating).
6Pezzin et al. [2003], Engers and Stern [2002] and Pezzin and Schone [1999] also examine care decisions
using game-theoretic models of family bargaining.
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impacts of parent care in the context of a model that not only allows for strategic inter-
actions among adult siblings when making family care decisions, but also recognizes two
theoretically competing uses of time, namely time spent working in the labor market and
time spent providing care for potentially noncoresident elderly parents.7
Consider a model of time allocation in which each sibling has an exogenously given time
endowment m. Suppose that, in period 1, the siblings make an arbitrary pair of location
decisions (lf , ls), and an arbitrary pair of employment decision (ef , es). And furthermore,
consider an arbitrary state k ∈ {h, l} that our game form admits in the second period. If
child i provides ski care units, then i’s (i = f, s) fixed time budget m is allocated among
three time uses: paid market work hki , time spent caring for parents s
k
i , and commuting
time:
m = hki (1 + δ
e
i ) + s
k
i (1 + δ
p
i ) (1)
The time cost per care visit ski is made up of one unit of time actually spent providing care
plus travel time that, by appropriate normalization, is equal to the actual distance
δpi = |li − x| (2)
between child i’s chosen place of residence li and the parents’ location. Similarly, the time
cost per labor market unit is made up of one unit of time actually spent working plus
commuting time that is equal to the actual distance
δei = |li − ei| (3)
between i’s chosen place of residence li and i’s chosen job location ei.
Market work hki earns child i an income wih
k
i which is assumed to be entirely spent
on private consumption ci. Recall that child i’s wage rate wi is endogenously determined
by her employment choice ei in period 1 (see Assumption 1). We shall assume that the
second-period utility for child i takes the linear form
uki = ci(s
k
i ) +G
k, where (4)
ci(s
k
i ) = wi[m− s
k
i (1 + δ
p
i )]/(1 + δ
e
i ). (5)
The equilibrium of our game has two key components. The first is the caregiving game
between adult siblings. The second is the equilibrium in the location game. It is assumed
that the two-stage game is one with complete information. Before proceeding to the study
7Of course, in reality, time spent working in the labor market and time spent providing care should not
be considered in isolation. Our results would be analogous, but slightly more complicated, if we were to
decompose the second period into a step where siblings negotiate caregiving shares and then each child
makes leisure and work decisions conditional on the care decision. Thus our approach should be viewed as
a “reduced form” of a model in which market time, time spent providing care and leisure time are jointly
determined.
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of the subgame-perfect equilibrium of our model, we investigate the model with an only
child, denoted o, who does not have a sibling to participate in the caregiving game.
4. An Only Child
Only children represent a kind of “controlled experiment” – what it is like to grow up
and make decisions unaffected by the externalities that siblings introduce into each other’s
environments. The analysis of the optimal actions of an only child is straightforward.
Assume that the underlying parameters are such that co(g
k) + Gk > co(0) for all k ∈
{l, h}; for otherwise gains from providing the required amount of care do not exist. Given
that gains from parental care exist, period 2 of the game is mechanical: child o is the
sole caregiver “de facto”, and provides gk care units in each state k (where k = l or
k = h). Accordingly, child o’s time budget is allocated between labor market units ho
that yield private consumption co(≡ woho) and family care units g
k in such a way that
m = ho(1 + δ
e
o) + g
k(1 + δpo) for given distances δeo and δ
p
o (which are defined above in (2)
and (3)). It follows that the end-of-period payoff to child o in each state k (k = l, h) will
be as in (4) and (5), but with ski replaced by g
k.
In period 1, child o maximizes expected utility by a location choice of lo ∈ [x, x] and
an employment choice of eo ∈ {x, x}.
8 Both the earnings differential between the origin
and destination area, ω ≡ w/w , and the degree of parental dependency, ρ, are key to the
analysis of the optimal employment and location decision of an only child (see Figure 1):
Result 1 (The Equilibrium Location of an Only Child) Given the above specifications, the
following results are obtained. In Regions A(1) and A(2), the optimal actions of child s
are to live and to seek employment in her home region at x. In Region A(3), the optimal
action of child s is to move in order to live and seek employment in the destination area at
x. In Region A(4), the optimal actions of child s are to live at her home region x and to
work in the destination area at x. The definitions of the regions are as follows:
A(1) = {(ω, ρ) ∈ [1,∞)× [0, 1] | ω ≤ ωˆ and ρ ≤ ρˆ}
A(2) = {(ω, ρ) ∈ [1,∞)× [0, 1] | ω ≤ 1 + ∆ and ρ > ρˆ}
A(3) = {(ω, ρ) ∈ [1,∞)× [0, 1] | ω > ωˆ and ρ < ρˆ}
A(4) = {(ω, ρ) ∈ [1,∞)× [0, 1] | ω > 1 + ∆ and ρ ≥ ρˆ}
where
ωˆ ≡
(m− gl)− ρ(gh − gl)
m− (1 + ∆)[gl + ρ(gh − gl)]
and ρˆ ≡
m− gl(2 + ∆)
(gh − gl)(2 + ∆)
. (6)
8In the Appendix it is shown that although any location in the interval [x, x] is possible, child o will
optimally locate at one extreme of the economy, that is, either at x or at x. It thus follows that the
equilibrium decisions of an only child are based on comparing four states of the world, namely lo = x or
lo = x combined with eo = x or eo = x.
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Residential and job mobility can take three patterns. The first is that in which both
residence and employment are sought in the home region [regions A(1) and A(2)]. There
can be two reasons for this type of outcome. The first is that a relatively low level of the
earnings differential w/w between the two labor market regions may induce a person not to
move, even in the presence of a low level of parental dependency as captured by a low value
of ρ [region A(1)]. The second reason for this type of outcome is that a high level parental
dependency may induce a person not to move, even when the earnings differential between
the origin and destination area is at relatively high (medium-valued) level [region A(2)].
The second observed pattern of mobility is that of job mobility accompanied by residential
mobility [region A(3)]. This type of mobility arises in response to relatively large earnings
differentials between the origin and destination area, and a low level of parental dependency.
Finally, the third type of mobility is that of job mobility, but residential attachment to the
home region [region A(4)]. This type of mobility exists because of a relatively high level of
parental dependency, which speaks in favor of living close to the parents’ place of residence.
On the other hand, the high wage differential between home and distant area speaks in
favor of working in the distant labor market and plays the role of compensating s for the
incurred commuting costs.
To summarize, since long-term care needs are taken into account prior to the parents
actually needing care, a child will not necessarily become a mover in all situations where
a potential for increased earning opportunities outside the parents’ origin location exists.
Furthermore, the more likely it is that a parent needs a substantial amount of care in the
near future, the lower the probability that an only child moves out of the home region. The
mobility pattern of siblings may have several different dimensions, as we will show next.
5. Siblings
5.1. Bargaining Equilibrium in the “Caregiving” Game In order to describe the
bargaining process (when k = h) in a simplified manner, we now assume that the bar-
gaining process is such that the equilibrium negotiated caregiving shares shf and s
h
s can be
characterized by the Nash bargaining solution (NBS, for short) in which the disagreement
point is given by
dhf = cf (0) and d
h
s = cs(0), (7)
where ci(0) (i = f, s) is as in (5), but with s
h
i = 0. It may be noted that the payoffs
encapsulated in dhf and d
h
s represent the impasse point in which f and s perpetually disagree
over how to share the required amount of parental care.9 The Nash bargaining solution of
9The way we apply Nash’s bargaining solution is informed by non-cooperative bargaining theory. In fact
the NBS of our bargaining problem is identical to the limiting equilibrium outcome of Rubinstein’s (1982)
alternating-offers bargaining game in which both players have inside options, and can also be derived in the
context of the “subscription game” analyzed by Admati and Perry (1991). For a thorough discussion of the
strategic foundations of the NBS see Muthoo (1999).
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the bargaining situation described above is the unique pair of caregiving shares, denoted
(sˆhf , sˆ
h
s ), that solves the following maximization problem:
max
sh
f
,shs
[
cf (s
h
f ) +G− cf (0)
] [
cs(s
h
s ) +G− cs(0)
]
(8)
subject to 0 ≤ shf ≤ g
h and shs = g
h − shf . The following proposition states the main result
of this section, which describes the equilibrium caregiving shares provided by f and s:
Result 2 (Bargaining Equilibrium) Consider the “caregiving game” in period 2, and fix
arbitrary actions (lf , ef ) and (ls, es) chosen in period 1. For each i, j ∈ {f, s}, define:
θi ≡
[
G (1 + δei )
wi (1 + δ
p
i )
]
. (9)
Then the equilibrium negotiated caregiving shares provided by f and s respectively are given
by
sˆhf =
gh + θf − θs
2
and sˆhs =
gh − θf + θs
2
. (10)
As expected, the sum of the Nash-bargained caregiving shares equals the required amount
of care. Notice that i’s (i = f, s) caregiving share sˆhi is strictly increasing in θi and strictly
decreasing in θj . Thus θi represents the inverse of i’s bargaining power, while θj is the
inverse of j’s bargaining power. A key and rather interesting feature of our caregiving game
is that the siblings’ bargaining powers are endogenously determined and depend crucially
on first-period actions as captured in the expressions θf and θs. Hence the equilibrium
caregiving shares sˆhf and sˆ
h
s are systematically pegged to the players’ value of time (as
captured by their wage rates wf and ws) and the locations of the players relative to that
of their parents (as captured by δpf and δ
p
s). It is particularly interesting to note that the
present result reconciles much of the empirical literature on family care decisions.
First, notice that for any arbitrary w1i and w
2
i such that w
1
i > w
2
i , it is the case that
sˆhi (w
1
i ) < sˆ
h
i (w
2
i ) and sˆ
h
j (w
1
i ) > sˆ
h
j (w
2
i ) for i, j = f, s and i 6= j. That is, a (marginal)
increase in child i’s wage rate decreases i’s share of the caregiving and increases child j’s
share of the caregiving. This suggests that adult siblings with higher wage rates are predis-
posed to spent less time providing care for older generations. This finding can readily be
interpreted using price-of-time arguments. As wage rates rise, time transfers become more
costly, and the negotiated caregiving arrangement will reflect the relative cost of parental
care of the parties involved. Empirical studies which provide evidence that supports this
result include Sloan et al. [1997], Couch et al. [1999], and Ermisch [2004].
Second, also note that for arbitrary distances δp1i and δ
p2
i such that δ
p1
i > δ
p2
i , we have
that sˆhi (δ
p1
i ) < sˆ
h
i (δ
p2
i ) and sˆ
h
j (δ
p1
i ) > sˆ
h
j (δ
p2
i ) for i, j = f, s and i 6= j. That is, an increase
in the distance between child i ’s place of residence and parents p’s place of residence
decreases i’s share of the caregiving and increases child j’s share of the caregiving. A basic
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notion captured here is that adult siblings offer more or less care assistance according to
their relative ability to offer such support which depends on a child’s location relative to
that of her parents. These finding is consistent with empirical evidence that children who
live close to the parents are perceived by other family members to be able to provide a
lion share of parental care (see, for example, Stern [1995]; Stern [1996]; Engers and Stern
[2002]; Ermisch [2004]).
5.2. Equilibrium in the Location Game. Continuing the backward induction, the
next step would be to characterize f and s’s employment and location choices in period 1.
We postpone this, however, to emphasize that the present framework points immediately
to a sharp distinction between the optimal actions of an only child and that of siblings.
Indeed our framework offers three channels through which the mobility pattern of siblings
may systematically differ from that of only children. We now discuss these three channels.
• Sibling Power Effect. With the players’ bargaining powers θf and θs (and hence care-
giving shares shf and s
h
s ) in period 2 being determined endogenously according to geographic
distance and economic status (wage income), rational individuals take into account how
their location and employment decisions impact — via the bargaining process — the family
decisions about care in the second period. If f and s recognize this dependence of ex-post
bargaining powers on ex-ante decisions, then they may use their location and employment
choices for purposes of maximizing their bargaining powers rather than simply to maxi-
mize their expected payoffs. In fact, it is as if siblings compete in location and employment
decisions so as to influence “who’s got the say” in family care decisions at latter stages.
• Resource Constraint Effect. The second channel that we highlight is the fact that
in families with (at least) two children, care provision may be a responsibility shared
across siblings. The ability of working-age adult siblings to figure out ways of sharing
responsibility for their parents can be viewed as a “softening” of the demands placed upon
their long-term resource constraints. Indeed, the very existence of an alternative family
caregiver helps adult children to better strike a balance between activities that yield private
consumption and family responsibilities. Of course, this positive externality is absent for
only children. Conversely, the equilibrium strategies adopted by f and s at any equilibrium
of the location game will subsume this externality in a rational manner.
• Birth-Order Effect. In the context of our model, birth order can be an important
factor in the choice of sibling strategies. To see this, recall that we assume that the older
child makes her location and employment decisions first, with the younger child moving
second. It is well understood that, in such an environment, the first-mover can influence
the decisions of the second-mover (see Konrad et al. [2002]). Hence, in addition to the
previous two effects, birth order might also influence the outcome of the location game.
We can now summarize the above discussion in the following result, which compares
the mobility decisions of adult siblings with that of only children (see Figure 2).
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Result 3 (Siblings v/s Only Children.) There is a set of parameter values, condition (C)
in the Appendix, for which the following results are obtained. In Region B(1), both a child
with a sibling and an only child would choose to live and seek employment in her home
region. In Region B(4), both a child with a sibling and and only child would choose to live
and seek employment in the distant labor market. In Region B(3), a child with a sibling
would choose to live and be employed in the distant labor market, while an only child would
choose to stay in her home region. Finally, in Region B(2), a child with a younger sibling
decides to work and live outside her home region, while a child with an elder sibling and
an only child stays in the same locality as her parents. The definitions of the regions are
as follows:
B(1) = {ω ∈ [1,∞) | ω ≤ ωˇ}
B(2) = {ω ∈ [1,∞) | ωˇ < ω ≤ ω˜}
B(3) = {ω ∈ [1,∞) | ω˜ < ω ≤ ωˆ}
B(4) = {ω ∈ [1,∞) | ω > ωˆ}
where
ωˇ ≡
2(m− gl)− ρ(gh − 2gl)
2[m− (1− ρ)gl(1 + ∆)]
and ω˜ ≡
2[(m− gl)− ρ(gh − gl)]
2m− (1 + ∆)[2gl + ρ(gh − 2gl)]
,
and where ωˆ is defined in (7).
The above result uncovers a close connection between the mobility pattern of young adults
and the following three factors: parental characteristics such as age that measure the degree
of parental dependency in the near future; the presence of a sibling; and the economic
circumstances and prospects in the region in which parents live. We now outline, in more
specific terms, the empirical predictions based on the above result.
Our basic insight is that children with a sibling differ systematically from only children
in their mobility pattern. Indeed the set of parameter values under which adult siblings
would decide to become movers when a potential for increased earnings opportunities out-
side their parents’ locality exists [Regions B(3) and B(4)] is strictly larger than the set of
parameter values under which only children would move [Region B(4)]. In a large popula-
tion, we would therefore expect to find that children with a sibling are on average located
further away from their parents than only children. For future reference, we record our
first observation as follows:
Prediction 1 Siblings are more likely than only children to respond to low economic
prospects in their home region by locating away from their parents.10
10While siblings are more likely to become movers than only children irrespective of birth order, our
model also demonstrates that firstborn siblings may exhibit yet higher propensities to move than second
13
It is well established that geographic mobility is a highly significant explanatory variable
for a person’s labor market outcomes. Our next prediction therefore refers to the effect of
adult children’s mobility patterns on labor market outcomes.
Prediction 2 Due to a higher propensity to locate away from their parents, adult siblings
from areas with high unemployment rates or rural regions have on average (a) higher labor
earnings, (b) a lower risk of unemployment, (c) higher full-time employment rates and (d)
lower rates of economic inactivity than only children from economically comparable regions.
Our predictions, so far, suggest that siblings not only exhibit higher rates of mobility than
only children, but as a consequence also have better labor market outcomes. What drives
this systematic difference between siblings and only children? Our graphical portrayal re-
veals that only children and siblings respond differently to variables that measure the degree
of parental dependency in the near future (as captured by the parameter ρ). Consider the
– arguably intuitive – reaction of an only child. The more likely it is that a parent needs
a substantial amount of care in the near future (i.e., the older the parent, all else equal),
the lower the probability that an only child moves away from the parents. In contrast, a
child with a sibling does not respond to a higher level of parental dependency by staying
close to her parents. This lack of responsiveness seems counterintuitive at first. The in-
tuition, however, is straightforward. Adult siblings negotiate over how to share caregiving
responsibilities when parental needs for support are high. Bargaining power is bound up in
this process. The sibling who lives closer to the parent and has a lower wage finds herself
more implicated in caregiving than the other. This translates into strategic incentives for
both siblings to actually move away to where high-valued employments are. The fact that
siblings – unlike only children – do not have an incentive to stay close to their parents when
the need for care is likely to intensify in the near future can thus be seen as evidence of
the sibling power effect. When investigating whether our results are driven by the sibling
power effect, we will therefore test the following:
Prediction 3 The more likely it is that a parent needs a substantial amount of care in
the near future (the older the parent, all else equal), the lower the probability that an only
child locates away from the parents. The location pattern of siblings, in contrast, is not sig-
nificantly negatively correlated with variables that proxy the degree of parental dependency.
When comparing different child types, we would therefore expect that the higher the mea-
sure of expected parental dependency, the larger the differences in the location patterns
between only children and siblings.
born siblings [Region B(2)]. Theoretically, the reason is that firstborn children make their location decisions
first, thereby influencing the decisions of the second born child (see Konrad et al. [2002]). We will be more
specific about this potential birth-order effect in the next section.
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6. Empirical Analysis
6.1. Data. The main data source used in this analysis is the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP).11 In 1984, this longitudinal survey began interviewing a national
sample of approximately 6000 households in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1990,
the SOEP was expanded to the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR),
including nearly 2200 new households. Individuals are re-interviewed each successive year,
and in the year a child in a sample household turns 16, she is interviewed in her own right.
Similarly, if individuals leave their original household to form a new one, all adults of this
new household are interviewed. Thus, the SOEP sample remains broadly representative of
the whole population in Germany as it changes over time.
In the years 1991, 1996 and 2001, the SOEP asked specific social network questions.
In particular, respondents were asked about the residential distance to their relatives.
This enables us to construct our main outcome variable, namely, the geographic distance
between adult children and their parents. The dependent variable, denoted D ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
distinguishes whether a child lives in the same household, house, or neighborhood as the
parents (D = 1), in the same town, but more than 15 minutes walk away (D = 2), in a
different town, but less than 1 hour of travel time away (D = 3), or further away (D = 4).12
We use the SOEP to construct a rich intergenerational data set covering adult children
from one and two-child families and their parents. The sample used in the analysis consists
of 631 biological children who finished their general education, are aged at least 25 and
have mothers who are SOEP respondents themselves. We restrict the sample to adult
children from one and two-child families so as to present estimates based on a sample
which mirrors our model environment. The selection criterium of choosing children whose
mothers are SOEP respondents themselves is introduced to guarantee that information on
parents directly comes from the mother and father.13 The selection criteria of including
adult children who have finished their education and are at least 25 years old are imposed
to guarantee that location decisions do not reflect educational choices such as a student’s
geographic move to a city with an university.
As a set of background variables which might affect a person’s geographic mobility,
we also include several socio-economic characteristics of adult children and their parents.
On the children’s side, we include age, sex, year of birth, marital status, foreigner, higher
educational degree, the presence and number of children aged 14 and less, and the region
of residence (East versus West Germany) as control variables. The variable “higher ed-
11For detailed information on the SOEP methodology, representativeness, and weighting see Haisken-
DeNew and Frick [2003] and Burkhauser et al. [1997].
12In the few cases in which the distance between children and their parents is observed in more than one
wave, we use the last year in which the information is available in the panel. As a result, 75 percent of the
child-parent distances are measured in the year 2001, 23 percent come from the year 1996, and 2 percent
from the year 1991. If the mother and father live at a different location, then the child-parent distance is
measured between the mother and the adult child.
13See Parsons [1975] for the advantages of self-reported information from both generations.
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ucational degree” is a dichotomous variable which equals one if the person received the
Abitur, a technical college degree or an university degree and is zero otherwise.14 The
variable “foreigner” equals one if the person does not have the German nationality and is
zero otherwise. Finally, the variable “East Germany” is a dichotomous variable indicating
whether the adult child lives in the region of the former German Democratic Republic.
The empirical work also demands a proxy for ρ in the model, the measure of expected
parental dependency. Our principal measure is the age of the oldest parent: as we increase
the age of the oldest parent, caregiving responsibilities should be more imminent for adult
children, increasing the weight attached to the possibility of being implicated in eldercare in
the near future. We also include the mother’s marital status and parental home-ownership
as additional factors that might influence the mobility pattern of young adults.
We construct two labor market variables with the aim of capturing the economic cir-
cumstances and prospects in a person’s home region. Our first measure is a dummy variable
which equals one if the unemployment rate in the parents’ federal state is above 9 percent
and is zero otherwise. Our second measure divides Germany into urban and rural areas. An
urban area is defined to be a city with more than 50,000 inhabitants.15 Standard economic
reasoning would suggest that adult children from economically disadvantaged regions (high
unemployment or rural areas) are likely to see a potential for increased life-time earnings by
moving away from their parents’ locality. Summary statistics are provided in the Appendix.
Before we present the results from our multivariate analysis, we provide some first de-
scriptive insights into our theoretical predictions. Figure 3 shows the geographic distance
between children and their parents for different child types. The figure reveals that both
firstborn and second born siblings locate on average further away from their parents than
only children. For example, only 41 percent of siblings live in the same town than their
parents, compared to 63 percent of only children. Independence tests between children
with a sibling and only children lead to a clear rejection of the null hypothesis that the
distance categories are statistically independent between siblings and only children. Simple
descriptive statistics also suggest a systematic difference in labor market outcomes between
only children and siblings. Table 1 shows that siblings from high unemployment or rural
areas have higher labor earnings than only children. Only children have a higher chance of
being unemployed and economically inactive compared to siblings. Moreover, the propor-
tion of adult siblings working full-time exceeds those of only children.16 While these first
casual observations seem to be in line with our predictions, nothing can be inferred from
14The Abitur is a school leaving certificate for those who successfully completed a Gymnasium – the
most academically demanding secondary school track in Germany. In an alternative specification, we have
used dummies for 5 different educational attainments. All our results are robust to the inclusion of this
alternative measure.
15We examined the sensitivity of our results by choosing alternative thresholds, i.e. unemployment rates
of 8 and 10 percent as cut-off values.
16The null hypothesis that the means of the labor market variables are equal for only children and siblings
is rejected for all outcome comparisons when applying mean equality tests.
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the results as they might be influenced by other socio-economic characteristics neglected
so far in the analysis. We now turn to a more careful examination of the data.
6.2. Baseline Results. In this section we provide evidence for the main implications
of the model. Our baseline result concerns the determinants of the geographic distance
between adult children and their parents. We estimate a parametric ordered probit model.17
Let X be a set of socio-economic controls. Let F denote being a firstborn sibling, while S
denotes being a second born sibling. The baseline specification is a latent variable model
of the form18
D∗ = ϕ1X + ϕ2F + ϕ3S + ε. (11)
The dependent variable is the geographic distance between an adult child and her parents.19
The reference category are only children. The basic prediction of the model is that both ϕ2
and ϕ3 are positive significant (siblings locate on average further away from their parents
than only children).
Baseline estimation results are collected in Table 2 where column (1) displays the esti-
mated coefficients of equation (11) and column (2) the corresponding standard errors. Our
first key result is that both ϕ2 and ϕ3 are highly significant and positive. In other words,
children with a sibling consistently locate further away from their parents than only chil-
dren.20 As for our control variables, having a higher educational degree and being married
is associated with higher geographic mobility. In contrast, parental home ownership and
being female is negatively correlated with geographic mobility. We will examine the rela-
tionship between the age of the oldest parent, which is our proxy for the parameter ρ in the
model, and geographic mobility in more detail in Section 6.3. To provide an quantitative
interpretation of the estimated coefficients, we compute the marginal effects of having a
sibling. The results – which are shown in Table 3 – provide strong evidence in line with our
basic prediction. A child with a sibling has on average a 15 percent lower chance of living in
the same household, house or neighborhood than an only child. The exact probabilities for
firstborn and second born siblings amount to 12 and 17 percent, respectively. Conversely,
for siblings, the probability of locating in the highest distance category is 5 to 7 percent
higher than for only children.
The above results indicate that adult siblings consistently locate further away from
their parents than only children. According to our model, this pattern is primarily driven
17We also examined a semi-parametric ordered probit model using a series estimator developed by Gallant
and Douglas [1987] and Stewart [2004]. The results were similar to the ones reported here and may be
obtained from the authors upon request.
18For notational convenience, we drop the subscript i which indicates the individual.
19More precisely, D∗ is an unobserved latent variable which is linked to the observed ordered response
distance variable D ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} if ηD−1 ≤ D
∗ < ηD. The η’s are threshold parameters to be estimated
assuming that η0 = −∞ and η4 = +∞.
20We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for firstborn and second born children are equal.
The p-value from a χ2-test that ϕ2 = ϕ3 is 0.267.
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by the fact that children with a sibling are more likely than only children to respond to
poor economic prospects in their home region by moving away from the parents. To study
this, we run separate regressions of the form
D∗ = χ1X + χ2F ·H + χ3S ·H + ε (12)
and
D∗ = ψ1X + ψ2F · L+ ψ3S · L+ ε. (13)
The variable H in (12) is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if parents live in a
region with high unemployment or in a rural area. Conversely, the variable L in (13) is a
dummy which equals 1 if parents live in a region with low unemployment or in an urban
area. Our model predicts that both χ2 and χ3 are significant positive.
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The results are given in Table 4. Column (1) contains estimated coefficients, while
marginal effects for adult children from high/low unemployment regions are reported in
column (2). The first two rows in column (1) report estimates from equation (12), whereas
the last two contain estimated results from equation (13). Coefficients in each row represent
results from separate regressions. Clearly, siblings from high unemployment or rural areas
locate on average further away than only children. Column (2) reports the corresponding
marginal effects. The exercise confirms that the results are not only statistically signifi-
cant, but also quantitatively important. For example, siblings from high unemployment
regions have a 12 to 20 percent higher chance of leaving the parents’ house or neighborhood
compared to only children. What is more, for children with a sibling, the probability of
locating in the two highest distance categories is 11 to 19 percent higher than for only
children. Once we compare child types from regions with low unemployment, no significant
differences in children’s mobility patterns are found.
Our results provide quite strong evidence that being a child with a sibling is associated
with higher geographic mobility. We now take our analysis a step further. Consistent
with the finding that different child types display different propensities to leave their home
region, one would expect that siblings from areas with poor economic prospects (high un-
employment or rural areas) display better labor market outcomes than only children. We
examine four outcome variables, namely, labor earnings, full-time employment, unemploy-
ment and economic inactivity. Since these labor market outcomes are observed every year
in the SOEP, we are able to estimate panel regressions here.
The results are in Table 5. We start by looking at adult children’s labor earnings
[Column (1)]. We estimate random effects panel earnings equations, assuming that the
random effects capture individual-specific factors such as motivation and temperament.
21Note that the reference category for equation (12) are only children from high unemployment or rural
areas. That is, the regression also includes the interaction terms F · L, S · L and O · L, where O denotes
being an only child. In contrast, the reference group for (13) are only children from low unemployment or
urban areas. Again, regressions include a full set of interaction terms.
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Our sample consists of all person-year observations where children work full-time and are
age 25 years and older. One striking result that can be seen from Table 5 is that siblings
from high unemployment regions have a whopping 10 percent higher labor earnings than
only children; similarly, siblings from rural areas display 7 percent higher earnings compared
to only children. Both results are highly significant, controlling for the socio-economic
variables discussed above.
We next present and discuss the marginal effects of panel probit models for our discrete
outcome variables [Columns (2) to (4)]. Notice that not only are the signs of the estimated
coefficients in line with our predictions, but the results are also highly significant. For
example, an adult sibling from a high unemployment region (rural) has a 10 percent higher
chance of being full-time employed compared to an only child from a comparable region.
Moreover, a child with a sibling also has a significant lower probability of being unemployed
and economically inactive.
Finally, the evidence presented in Table 4 suggested that adult children from low unem-
ployment and urban areas do not significantly differ in their mobility pattern. Consistent
with this observation, the differences in labor market outcomes almost entirely disappear
once we compare child types from low unemployment and urban areas.
6.3. Inspecting the Mechanism. Our predictions, so far, are confirmed by the data.
In this subsection, we turn to the channels whereby siblings differ from only children.
Following the model, we analyze how adult children respond to the age of the oldest parent
– our proxy of expected parental dependency in the model. We start with a simple exercise
by running separate equations for only children and siblings of the form
D∗only = φ1X + φ2A+ ε and D
∗
sib = ξ1X + ξ2A+ ε. (14)
where A denotes the age of the oldest parent. For only children, the model predicts that
φ2 is significant negative. That is, the geographic mobility of only children is negatively
correlated with variables that proxy the degree of parental dependency. Siblings, in con-
trast, do not have an incentive to stay closer to the parents when the need for care is
likely to intensify in the near future. Thus, the coefficient ξ2 is expected not to be statis-
tically negative significant. Table 6 shows our results for (14). The estimates support the
mechanism highlighted in the model: the age of the oldest parent has a highly significant
negative effect on the geographic mobility of only children; the mobility pattern of siblings,
in contrast, is not significantly affected by age of the oldest parent.22 We consider this lack
of responsiveness as evidence of the sibling power effect put forward in the model.
An alternative way to test for the mechanism highlighted in the model is to actually
22Indeed, the hypothesis that the age of the oldest parent is statistically different from zero was rejected
for siblings but not for only children. The p-value of a χ2-test that φ2 = 0 for only children is 0.003.
Conversely, for firstborn and second born siblings the p-values that ξ2 = 0 are 0.237 and 0.909, respectively.
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compare siblings with only children by controlling for differences in socio-economic charac-
teristics. To do so, let us go back to the graphical portrayal of our main theoretical result
in Figure 2. Consider an adult child who perceives the risk of parental dependency, ρ, to
be very small (e.g., a child with very young parents). Holding everything else constant, the
figure reveals that there is no difference between the location pattern of siblings and only
children when ρ is very small. However, as we increase the measure of parental dependency
(i.e., the age of the oldest parent) while keeping everything else equal, the difference in the
mobility pattern between only children and siblings becomes more pronounced. To test
this, let us divide our children into three groups, ρ ∈ {60−, 60+, 65+}. The first group
comprises all children whose oldest parent is younger than 60 years. The second group
contains adult children whose oldest parent is 60 years or older. Finally, the third group
is made up of all children whose oldest parent is 65 years or older. We estimate three
equations of the form:
D∗ = αX + βρF · Iρ + γρS · Iρ + ε. (15)
The variable Iρ in (15) is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the oldest parent falls in
one of the three age categories and is zero otherwise. Reference categories are only children
with the oldest parent in the relevant age group.23 The model predicts that β−60 and
γ−60 do not show a statistically significant sign. In contrast, β+60, γ+60, β+65 and γ+65
are expected to be significant positive, with the magnitudes of the coefficients β+65 and
γ+65 exceeding those of β+60 and γ+60, respectively. Results are collected in Table 7 where
column (1) gives the estimated coefficients and column (2) the corresponding marginal
effects. For siblings with young parents, we see that the coefficients β−60 and γ−60 are
indeed insignificant. That is, siblings with young parents do not exhibit higher rates of
mobility than only children. Next, we consider the mobility pattern of children with older
parents. Again, the model’s predictions are supported by the results – siblings with older
parents are significantly more likely to locate away from their parents compared to only
children. Furthermore, the higher the measure of expected parental dependency (the older
the parent, all else equal), the larger the differences in the geographic mobility between
only children and siblings. Overall, the pattern found here seems to mirror the graphical
portrayal of our main theoretical result.
The major prediction of the model was that, irrespective of birth order, siblings sym-
metrically exhibit higher rates of geographic mobility than only children [Region (3) in
Figure 2]. We have found very strong evidence in line with this prediction. As an aside,
the model also predicted that firstborn siblings may exhibit yet higher rates of mobility
than second born siblings [Region (2) in Figure 2]. Theoretically, the reason for this “birth
23For example, when comparing siblings and only children with young parents, the regression also includes
the interactions F · (1 − I−60), S · (1 − I−60) and O · (1 − I−60), where I−60 = 1 if the age of the oldest
parent is 60 years or younger.
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order effect” is that firstborn siblings make their location decisions first, thereby influencing
the decisions of the second born sibling (as in Konrad et al. [2002]). Empirically, we find
no evidence here that is line with the birth order effect. In fact, while children with a sib-
ling are more mobile than only children, there is no significant difference between firstborn
and second born siblings. Thus the proposition here is this: the very presence of a sibling
matters a lot more than birth order.
But why is it that we don’t find any evidence for the birth order effect? Doesn’t this run
counter to the argument that a sequential game typically exhibits a first mover advantage
as in our theoretical environment? Let us look to another field of research for an answer.
Psychologists have long emphasized that younger siblings typically develop abilities and
traits that help them offset the older’s age advantage. For example, second born siblings are
less likely to identify with parents, more inclined to look for unconventional opportunities,
and less risk averse than firstborn siblings (Sulloway [1996]). We consider these facts as
potential explanations for why we find no significant difference in the mobility pattern
between firstborn and second born siblings despite the older’s first mover advantage.
6.4. Evidence for the United States. Are the above results country-specific for Ger-
many, rather than representing a general phenomenon? To investigate this, we now provide
some empirical evidence for the United States. We use the first wave of the National Survey
of Family and Households (NSFH), a cross-sectional sample of adults aged 19 and older
living in the US. Because the NSFH collects detailed information on the geographic dis-
tance between parents and children (reported in miles) and socio-economic characteristics
for both generations it is an ideal data set to complement our findings for Germany.
We limit our sample to adult children whose mothers did not move in the last five years
and who have either one child or two biological children aged 30 and above. This leaves
us with a sample of 523 adult children whose socio-economic characteristics are reported
by their mothers. Among those, 29 percent are only children. On average, only children
locate 288 miles away from their parents’ residence. In contrast, firstborn (second born)
children live on average 422 (414) miles away from their parents’ place. The average child
is 43 years old, 52 percent are daughters, and 77 percent are married. The average age of
the oldest parent is 71 years.
Estimates of tobit regressions are presented in Table 8. The results do make clear that
the behavior of adult children in the US shows the same pattern as in Germany. Each
column shows the coefficients of a separate regression. Column (1) contains the results
for our baseline specification. It shows that children with a sibling locate further away
from their parents than only children. The result is significant, controlling for a host of
background variables. Column (2) presents the results for interacting siblings with having
parents who live in regions with high local poverty levels.24 It shows that siblings from
24Since the NSFH provides information about local poverty levels rather unemployment rates, we use the
former as a proxy for economically disadvantaged regions.
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disadvantaged regions are more likely to locate away from their parents compared to only
children. Looking at regions with better economic prospects, no differences are found in
the mobility pattern between different child types. Column (3) reports the results for
interacting siblings with the age of the oldest parent. Siblings with young parents are not
different in their mobility pattern compared to only children; in contrast, siblings with old
parents exhibit significantly higher rates of mobility than only children. Thus, our findings
for the United States appear to show again that only children and siblings differ in the way
in which they respond to variables that proxy the degree of parental dependency.
6.5. Robustness, Validation and Caveats. We have subjected the results for Germany
to a variety of robustness checks.
• Unobserved Heterogeneity. Readers may be concerned that our results are driven
by children’s characteristics which are unobservable to the researcher. To address this
concern, we now present results of a random effect ordered panel model. To make use of
the panel structure of the SOEP, we are relying on the following three distance categories
which are available in each wave of the SOEP: child and parents live in (a) same household,
(b) different household but same federal state, (c) different federal states. The results are
presented in Table 9. Overall, the findings suggest that our evidence for Germany is robust
to controlling for children’s unobservable characteristics.
• Age Gap between Parents. The age gap between mother and father might affect
children’s mobility pattern. For example, having an old father might be less constraining
for an adult child whose mother is young, in good health and able to look after her husband,
compared to children with two elderly and frail parents. In unreported regressions, we
controlled for the age gap between parents. Strikingly, we found indeed evidence that
the parental age differential is positively correlated with children’s geographic mobility.
However, our major finding concerning the relationship between child type and geographic
mobility is robust to including the parental age differential.25
• An Alternative Proxy for Expected Parental Dependency. The state of parental depen-
dency was defined as a situation in which parents need physical or emotional support from
their adult children. Our model predicted that only children and siblings respond differently
to variables that measure the degree of expected parental dependency. We investigated this
prediction using the age of the oldest parent as the main proxy for expected parental de-
pendency. In unreported estimation exercises, we examined an alternative proxy: whether
or not the mother is single. Our idea is that children with single mothers attach more
weight to the possibility of having to satisfy the social needs of the parent than children
25We also controlled for the influence of alternative potential care providers (such as whether parents have
relatives other than children in the same town ), the age gap between siblings and various health measures
for both children and their parents such as disability, number doctor visits in the previous 3 months or
hospital stay in the previous year. Moreover, we included parental household income and whether or not
parents are self-employed as explanatory variables. The results where insensitive to the inclusion of these
additional controls.
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with married parents. The prediction of the model would be that the mobility pattern
of only children is negatively correlated with the mother being single, while the mobility
pattern of siblings is not negatively affected by having a single mother. Our results did
confirm this prediction. Consistent with the results reported in Table 7, the estimation
showed that siblings with a single mother have a 17 percent higher chance to locate in the
highest distance category compared to only children with a single mother. No significant
difference is found between siblings and only children whose parents are married.
• Leaving the Nest. Recent years have witnessed a trend towards older age at which
children leave their parents’ home (Szydlik [2000], Wagner and Huinink [1991]). Suppose
for a moment that this is in particular true for only children. Then our findings might
be driven by the fact that only children leave their parental home later than children
with a sibling. To account for this possibility, we experimented with the age of children
and extracted samples of older children (i.e., children aged 26, 27, 28, 29, 30). While this
exercise did lead to smaller sample sizes, it did not disturb our basic result that siblings
are more likely to locate away from their parents than only children.
• Siblings’ Sex Composition. Previous studies find that middle age daughters are most
likely to be the primary caregiver (Checkovich and Stern [2002]). It is thus interesting to
investigate whether mobility pattern of young adults differ by gender. To examine this, we
re-estimated our model by comparing the location decisions of male and female siblings with
that of only children. In unreported regressions, we found that both daughters and sons
from two-child families show a significant higher propensities to locate in a high distance
category compared to only children.
• Parents’ Geographic Mobility. For simplicity, our theoretical model assumes that
parents are inactive, i.e., they are not allowed to move. This might appear as a restrictive
assumption and the reader might object with it. However, the assumption is entirely in
line with stylized mobility facts in Germany. In fact, less than 3 percent of households with
a member older than 60 years move house every year.26
• Caveats. It is important to air some caveats. First, for the most part of our empirical
analysis, we observed the geographic distance between adult children and their parents at
given points in time. Thus, we were not able to provide a complete picture of mobility
patterns over children’s entire lifespan. Second, we did not find a valid instrument (such
as twins) for an exogenous variation in family size. This would have helped us to unravel
more of a causal relationship than the present estimates do. Finally, our empirical results
are based on relatively small sample sizes.27
26This figure is based on own calculations using SOEP data from 2004.
27However, we repeated the descriptive exercise in Section 6.1 without restricting the sample to children
whose parents are SOEP respondents. This did yield considerable larger sample sizes. For example, when
we extracted adult children aged 40 or older, our sample consisted of 1730 only children and 7025 siblings.
Irrespective of the particular age threshold used in the sample selection, the percentage of siblings locating
in higher distance categories always significantly exceeded those of only children.
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7. Discussion
The results presented above deliver a number of specific insights, some of which we have
already discussed. We now highlight the major points more generally and present implica-
tions that are relevant to some.
• Demographic Trends in Europe and Geographic Mobility. Geographic mobility in the
EU is relatively low, both between and within member states. Within member states, in
spite of persistent regional labor market disparities, there is often little movement to regions
with lower unemployment and higher income. Unsurprisingly, improving the potential for
mobility is high on the policy agenda. For example, it is well understood that in many
EU member states, centralized wage agreements need to take better account of regional
differences in productivity and labor market conditions; reforms of unemployment benefit
systems are necessary to give people an incentive to move to a location where they can get
a job; the functioning of the housing market needs to be improved by cutting transaction
costs, such as taxes and fees for real estate agents, notaries and land registration.
However, in thinking about what different policy options are out there for increasing
the potential for geographic mobility, it has not been considered before that any such policy
may be hampered by demographic trends which are currently reshaping family structures in
virtually any EU country. Here we mention two such trends. The first is the trend toward
delayed first childbirth. The second is the decline in fertility rates and the growing trend
towards one-child families, commonly referred to as the emergence of the “beanpole family”.
The first trend matters because it boosts the average age at which women have children and
thus increases the mean parent-child age difference. The trend towards one-child families
matters because only children (unlike siblings) respond to an increase in the parent-child
age difference by staying close to their parents, even if they thereby forfeit better career
prospects in regions with lower unemployment and higher income. Hence it is conceivable
that the force toward delayed first child birth, and the decline in fertility rates, are likely
to be obstacles to geographic mobility in the future. It thus follows that the policy options
mentioned above may not be sufficient in generating higher levels of geographic mobility.
In fact, the lesson for policy-makers here is this: with families shrinking horizontally and
fewer siblings around, what is needed is a strategy for sharing the burden of elder care
between adult children and the state; for, otherwise, the number of people who will be
limited to move very far because of familial obligations might dramatically decrease the
potential for mobility as an equilibrating economic mechanism.
• Geographic Mobility in Europe and the US. It is a stylized fact that mobility rates
in Europe are low compared to the US. Major reasons usually put forward to explain
this difference include a combination of relatively high aggregate unemployment, intrinsic
preferences against mobility, and policy-induced distortions (Braunerhjelm et al. [2000]).
Our results suggest that there is a case to argue that the lower mobility in Europe can to
an extent also be explained by two demographic factors. First, at the end of the 1990s,
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the total fertility rate was about 1.31 children per woman in Germany while the U.S. rate
was 2.04. Second, the mean age of mother at first birth in the United States was 24.9 in
2000, while in Germany the mean age was 29.0 years (Mathews and Brady [2002], Council
of Europe [2001]). Trying to understand the difference in mobility rates between Europe
and the United States without taking these demographic fundamentals into account could
be quite deceptive and lead to biased results. What goes along with lower fertility rates
in Europe is the increasing prevalence of only child families. The higher parent-child age
differential in Europe might mean that the average European child perceives caregiving
responsibilities to be more imminent than the average child in the United States. The
demographic explanations might at least partially contribute to lower mobility rates in
Europe compared to the United States. To shed more light on this issue, a cross-country
assessment is required, which we leave for future research.
8. Conclusion
Adult children represent the largest proportion of primary caregivers of older persons,
devoting significant amounts of time providing care. This paper examines how long-term
care responsibilities and family structure interact in affecting child mobility characteristics.
We argue that having a sibling can have a profound impact on one’s geographic mobility
and labor market outcomes. Two ideas take center stage in our story: that young adults
make decisions relative to long-term care decisions long before the actual care is needed;
and that strategic interactions which are to be found in the relationship between siblings –
for example, their striving for “say” in parental care decisions – have a determinate effect
on their mobility pattern.
We concluded from our theoretical analysis that the location choices of siblings interact
with family care decisions at later stages so as to cause an equilibrium in which siblings not
only exhibit higher rates of mobility than only children, but also have better labor market
outcomes. Evidence based on data from Germany and the United States showed that
having a sibling has indeed a statistically significant positive effect on geographic mobility
and labor market outcomes. Clearly, a great deal more research is needed to understand
how long-term elder care decisions and family structure interact in affecting child mobility
characteristics. But for economists who are interested in patterns of geographic mobility,
it may be important to pay closer attention to our most universal social institution – the
family.
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Table 1: Means of Labor Market Outcome Variables by Child Type (Germany)
Parents live in high Parents live in
unemployment region rural area
Only children Siblings Only children Siblings
Labor earnings 28,466 31,526 28,398 32,709
Unemployment 7.6 4.1 6.7 4.2
Economic inactivity 23.2 19.2 23.4 17.3
Full-time employment 60.0 67.0 59.2 67.3
Notes: Figures are means computed on all available person-year observations where children are
age 25 and above and have finished their general education. Outcome variables are observed in
waves 1-20 in the SOEP. Earnings are annual labor earnings for young adults working full-time
and are deflated using the Consumer Price Index and are expressed in 2001 Euros. Looking at
the labor market outcomes for firstborn and second born children reveals that both child types
have favorable outcomes in comparison to only children. For example, firstborn (second born)
children whose parents live in federal states with high unemployment have the following outcome
variables. Labor earnings: 30,871 (32,410); unemployment: 3.6 (4.8); economic inactivity: 18.9
(19.5); full-time employment: 66.2 (68.6).
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Table 2: Determinants of Child-Parents Geographic Distance (Germany)
(1) (2)
Coefficient Standard Error
Children’s Characteristics:
Age 0.001 0.023
Female -0.178∗ 0.098
Year of birth 0.002 0.021
Foreigner -0.104 0.216
East Germany -0.129 0.141
Married 0.270∗∗ 0.114
Dependent children -0.201 0.205
Number of dependent children 0.102 0.117
Higher education 0.683∗∗ 0.102
Firstborn 0.297∗∗ 0.121
Second born 0.421∗∗ 0.125
Parents’ Characteristics:
Age of oldest parent -0.028∗∗ 0.008
Mother is single 0.095 0.122
Parent(s) are homeowner -0.333∗∗ 0.119
Labor market in the home region:
High unemployment region 0.196 0.124
Rural area 0.224∗ 0.118
Threshold parameters:
η1 2.126 42.41
η2 2.637 42.41
η3 3.486 42.42
Log likelihood -707.83
Number of individuals 631
Notes: Ordered probit estimation results. The dependent variable is the geographic distance
between adult children and their parents. Standard errors allow for arbitrary serial correla-
tion. Reference categories are male, nonmarried, no children, German citizen living in West
Germany, no higher educational degree, married parents living in an urban area with low
unemployment, parents are not home owners, and only child. We denote significance at the
5 and 10 percent level with ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
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Table 3: The Effects of Having a Sibling on the Probability to Locate in a Certain Distance
Category (Germany)
(1) (2)
Firstborn Second born
Same household, house, neighborhood -0.118∗∗ -0.166∗∗
(0.048) (0.049)
Same town, >15 min. walk 0.014∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Different town 0.056∗∗ 0.079∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Further away 0.048∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.021) (0.025)
Number of individuals 631
Notes: Estimates are marginal effects from ordered probit regressions computed at
average values of all variables used. The dependent variable is the geographic distance
between adult children and their parents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 4: Child-Parents Geographic Distance by Economic Prospects in Home Region (Ger-
many)
(1) (2)
Estimated Coefficients Marginal Effects
Firstborn Second born Firstborn Second born
Labor market in home region:
High Unemployment 0.313∗∗ 0.509∗∗
(0.141) (0.147)
Rural area 0.368∗∗ 0.411∗∗
(0.154) (0.155)
Low Unemployment 0.253 0.250
(0.205) (0.218)
Urban area 0.157 0.453∗∗
(0.172) (0.194)
Children from high UE regions:
Same neighborhood -0.124∗∗ -0.199∗∗
(0.056) (0.056)
Same town, > 15 min. walk 0.012∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Different town 0.053∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.027) (0.034)
Further away 0.053∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.027) (0.034)
Children from low UE regions:
Same neighborhood -0.100 -0.099
(0.081) (0.086)
Same town, > 15 min. walk 0.009∗ 0.009∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Different town 0.047 0.047
(0.038) (0.040)
Further away 0.042 0.042
(0.039) (0.042)
Number of individuals 631
Notes: UE denotes unemployment. Ordered probit estimation results. The dependent variable is the geographic
distance between adult children and their parents. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. We only report
the interactions which are of most interest, however, all regressions include a full set of interaction terms. Other
covariates as in Table 2. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5: The Effects of Having a Sibling on Labor Market Outcomes (Germany)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables: Log Labor Full-time Economic
Earnings employment Unemployment inactivity
LM in the home region:
High Unemployment 0.095∗∗ 0.098∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.041∗
(0.035) (0.048) (0.002) (0.024)
Rural area 0.066∗∗ 0.097∗∗ -0.001 -0.044∗
(0.036) (0.047) (0.002) (0.025)
Low Unemployment 0.092∗∗ 0.002 -0.002 -0.012
(0.037) (0.053) (0.002) (0.028)
Urban area 0.026 -0.023 -0.001 0.069
(0.048) (0.071) (0.002) (0.043)
Number of person-year
observations: 2927 4616 4626 4642
Number of individuals: 506 605 605 607
Notes: Log earnings regressions are random effect panel estimations. The other estimates (column 3-5) are
random effect panel probit regressions. Other covariates as in Table 4. Regressions using unemployment levels as
part of the reference category do not control for region of residence due to multicollinearity problems. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
Table 6: Child-Parents Geographic Distance by Age of the Oldest Parent (Germany)
(1) (2) (3)
Only Children Firstborn Secondborn
Age of oldest Parent -0.039∗∗ -0.001 -0.025
(0.013) (0.019) (0.018)
Number of individuals 279 176 176
Notes: Ordered probit estimations results. The dependent variable is the geographic
distance between adult children and their parents. Figures in each row represent esti-
mated coefficients from a different regression. Other covariates as in Table 2 excluding
the dummy variables for being a firstborn or second born child. Standard errors are
given in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent
level, respectively.
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Table 7: Child-Parents Geographic Distance by Age of the Oldest Parent (Germany)
(1) (2)
Estimated Coefficients Marginal Effects
Firstborn Second born Firstborn Second born
Age of oldest parent:
≤ 60 0.142 0.102
(0.185) (0.152)
> 60 0.653∗∗ 0.612∗∗
(0.178) (0.162)
> 65 0.805∗∗ 0.869∗∗
(0.262) (0.206)
Age of oldest parent ≤ 60:
Same neighborhood -0.041 -0.040
(0.061) (0.061)
Same town, > 15 min. walk 0.005 0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
Different town 0.020 0.019
(0.029) (0.031)
Further away 0.016 0.015
(0.025) (0.035)
Age of oldest parent > 60:
Same neighborhood -0.056 -0.113
(0.073) (0.072)
Same town, > 15 min. walk 0.007 0.011∗∗
(0.007) (0.004)
Different town 0.110∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.025) (0.023)
Further away 0.134∗∗ 0.174∗∗
(0.048) (0.056)
Age of oldest parent > 65:
Same neighborhood -0.298∗∗ -0.362∗∗
(0.081) (0.075)
Same town, > 15 min. walk -0.009 -0.029
(0.021) (0.029)
Different town 0.120∗∗ 0.128∗∗
(0.023) (0.017)
Further away 0.188∗∗ 0.263∗∗
(0.084) (0.101)
Number of individuals 631
Notes: Ordered probit estimation results. The dependent variable is the geographic distance between adult
children and their parents. Estimates in each row represent coefficients or marginal effects from a different
regression. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. We only report the interactions which are of most
interest, however, all regressions include a full set of interaction terms. Other covariates are as in Table 2. ∗
and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 8: Child-parents Geographic Distance by Child Type, Economic Prospects in Home
Region and Age of the Oldest Parent (United States)
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Prediction 1 Prediction 3
Firstborn 0.189∗
(0.100)
Second born 0.191∗
(0.102)
Firstborn × Poor Region 0.511∗
(0.277)
Second born × Poor Region 0.590∗∗
(0.278)
Firstborn × Non-Poor Region 0.144
(0.107)
Second born × Non-Poor Region 0.149
(0.108)
Firstborn × Young Parents -0.017
(0.146)
Second born × Young Parents 0.089
(0.146)
Firstborn × Old Parents 0.386∗∗
(0.135)
Second born × Old Parents 0.234∗
(0.137)
Number of individuals 523
Notes: Tobit estimation results. The dependent variable is the geographic distance between
adult children and their parents in miles. Each column presents results from one regres-
sion. Coefficients are divided by 1000. Regressions also include indicators for children’s age,
sex, marital status, children’s highest educational degree, mother’s marital status, parental
homeowernship and race of mother. The first two regressions also control for two local labor
market variables. The first one is a dichotomous variable which equals one if parents’ live in a
non-metropolitan area and is zero otherwise. The second labor market variable (’poor’ home
region) is a dichotomous variable which equals one if more than 15 percent of families in the
county have an income below the poverty line and is zero otherwise. Similarly, the third re-
gression also controls for whether parents live in a non-metropolitan area or not. Children’s
educational information comes from wave 2 of the NSFH. Missing values are imputed via
multivariate imputation using regression switching (van Buuren et al. [1999]). A “young”
parent is defined as being younger than 70. An “old” parent is defined as being older than
70. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 9: Child-Parents Geographic Distance by Child Type, Economic Prospects in Home
Region and Age of the Oldest Parent (Germany)
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Prediction 1 Prediction 3
Firstborn 0.197∗
(0.115)
Second born 1.229∗∗
(0.139)
Firstborn × High UE 0.272∗
(0.151)
Second born × High UE 0.460∗∗
(0.177)
Firstborn × Low UE 0.112
(0.148)
Second born × Low UE 0.228
(0.176)
Firstborn × Young Parents -0.155
(0.132)
Second born × Young Parents -0.137∗∗
(0.150)
Firstborn × Old Parents 0.586∗∗
(0.231)
Second born × Old Parents 1.521∗∗
(0.177)
Number of person-year observations 4642
Number of individuals 631
Notes: Random effect ordered probit estimation results. The dependent variable is the geographic
distance between adult children and their parents, consisting of the following three distance cat-
egories: (a) same household, (b) different household but same federal state, (c) different federal
state. Sample includes person-year observations of adult children who are aged 25 years and older
and who have finished their general education. Other control variables are as in Tables 2,4 and 7.
∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. A “young” parent
is defined as being younger than 60. An “old” parent is defined as being older than 60.
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Appendix A: Theory
Proof of Result 1. Fix an arbitrary location choice lo ∈ [x, x] and employment choice eo ∈ {x, x} made by child o
in period 1. Assume that the underlying parameters are such that co(gk)+Gk > co(0) for all k ∈ {l, h}; for otherwise
there are no gains to providing the required amount of care. The payoff to child o at the end of period 2 in each
state k (where k = l or k = h) will be as in equations (4) and (5) in the main text, but with ski replaced by g
k. In
period 1, child o maximizes expected utility Eo = (1 − ρ)ulo + ρu
h
o by location choice lo ∈ [x, x] and employment
choice eo ∈ {x, x}. For explicitness, note that
Eo(lo, eo) =
wo
1 + δeo

m− (1 + δpo)[g
l + ρ(gh − gl)]

+

Gl + ρ(Gh −Gl)

, (16)
where δpo = |lo − x| and δ
e
o = |lo − eo|. Since
∂Eo(lo, eo)
∂ls
≷ 0⇐⇒ wo

−m+ (eo − x)[g
l + ρ(gh − gl)

≷ 0, (17)
it follows immediately that child o will choose to locate at one extreme of the economy, that is, either at x or at x.
As a consequence, the equilibrium location and employment decisions of o are based on comparing the four states of
the world, lo = x or lo = x combined with eo = x or eo = x. Under Assumption 1, the expected payoffs from the
four actions (lo, eo) ∈ {x, x} × {x, x} are respectively given by
Eo(lo, eo) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
w(m− g˜) + G˜ if (lo, eo) = (x, x)
w(m− g˜)/(1 + ∆) + G˜ if (lo, eo) = (x, x)
w [m− (1 + ∆)g˜] /(1 + ∆) + G˜ if (lo, eo) = (x, x)
w [m− (1 + ∆)g˜] + G˜, if (lo, eo) = (x, x)
,
where g˜ = gl + ρ(gh − gl) and G˜ = Gl + ρ(Gh − Gl). As a starting point, note that it is not necessary to consider
(lo, eo) = (x, x) as a potential equilibrium outcome because Eo(x, x) is strictly less than Eo(x, x), Eo(x, x) and
Eo(x, x) for all possible parameter values.
The action (lo, eo) = (x, x) will be an equilibrium if and only if Eo(x, x) > Eo(x, x) and Eo(x, x) > Eo(x, x).
The critical value ρˆ [which is stated in the proposition] follows immediately after solving the former inequality for ρ,
while the critical value ωˆ [which is stated in the proposition] follows immediately after solving the latter inequality
for the ratio w/w.
The action (lo, eo) = (x, x) will be an equilibrium if and only if Eo(x, x) ≤ Eo(x, x) and Eo(x, x) > Es(x, x). It
is now readily checked that (x, x) will be optimal if and only if ρ ≥ ρˆ and w > (1 + ∆)w. The proposition and its
graphical portrayal in Figure 1 now follows immediately.
Proof of Result 2. Recall that if f and s reach an agreement A ≡ {(sh
f
, shs )|s
h
f
+ shs ≥ g
h} on how to share
caregiving responsibilities, then the second-period utility for player i (i = f, s) takes the linear form
uhi = ci(s
h
i ) +G
h, (18)
where
ci(s
h
i ) = wi[m− s
h
i (1 + δ
p
i )]/(1 + δ
e
i ). (19)
If, on the other hand, f and s fail to reach an agreement and perpetually disagree over how to share the required
amount of care gh, then their payoffs are given by
dhf = cf (0) and d
h
s = cs(0), (20)
where ci(0) (i = f, s) is as in equation (5), but with s
h
i = 0. The Nash bargaining solution of the bargaining situation
described in the text is the unique pair of caregiving shares, denoted (sˆh
f
, sˆhs ), that maximizes the Nash product
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(uh
f
− dh
f
)(uhs − d
h
s ) subject to 0 ≤ s
h
f
≤ gh and shs = g
h − sh
f
. Thus the Nash bargaining solution solves
max
sh
f
,shs
"
Gh − shf
 
wf (1 + δ
p
f
)
1 + δe
f
!#

Gh − shs

ws(1 + δ
p
s )
1 + δes

(21)
subject to 0 ≤ sh
f
≤ gh and shs = g
h − sh
f
. After substituting shs = g
h − sh
f
into the above problem and maximizing
the resulting expression with respect to sh
f
, one readily obtains the Nash bargained caregiving shares (sˆh
f
, sˆhs ) stated
in the proposition.
Proof of Result 3. For the sake of simplicity, but without any loss of generality, we restrict the proof of this
proposition to parameter values satisfying the following:
Assumption 4 Let gl < gh < m/(2 + ∆).
Under this assumption, the equilibrium mobility decisions of an only child are as illustrated in Figure 1(b). Consider
now the equilibrium mobility characteristics of children with a sibling. Fix arbitrary actions (lf , ef ) and (ls, es)
chosen in period 1. The payoff to child i (i = f, s) at the end of period 2 in each state k (where k = l or k = h)
will be as in equations (4) and (5) in the main text. Given assumptions 3 and 4, the care units provided by player i
(i = f, s) in each state k that our game form admits are given by28
ski =
8
<
:
gl if k = l
gh+θi−θj
2
if k = h
(i 6= j), (22)
where
θi =
"
Gh(1 + δei )
wi(1 + δ
p
i )
#
. (23)
In period 1, each player i (i = f, s) maximizes expected utility (1 − ρ)uli + ρu
h
i by location choice li ∈ [x, x] and
employment choice ei ∈ {x, x}. For explicitness, note that
Ei =
wi
1 + δei

m− (1 + δpi )[s
l
i + ρ(s
h
i − s
l
i)]

+

Gl + ρ(Gh −Gl)

(24)
Also note that we have omitted the arguments of the choice variables for simplicity: sli = s
l
i(li, ei), s
h
i = s
h
i (li, ei),
wi = wi(ei), δ
e
i = δ
e
i (li, ei) and δ
p
i = δ
p
i (li). After differentiating Ei with respect to li, it is readily checked that
player i will choose to locate at one extreme of the economy, that is, either at x or at x. It thus follows immediately
that each player has essentially four pure strategies, namely li = x or li = x combined with ei = x or ei = x.
In period 1, child f moves first in choosing (lf , ef ) and child s moves second in choosing (ls, es). In doing so,
each child will choose her actions recognizing how her choice will interact with that of her sibling in determining the
equilibrium negotiated caregiving shares in the second period. We now solve the location game in period 1 using the
standard backwards induction procedure.
Suppose that player f chooses (lf , ef ) = (x, x) at the first stage of period 1. Player s’s equilibrium negotiated
caregiving shares in period 2 (when k = h) from the four pure strategies (ls, es) ∈ {(x, x), (x, x), (x, x), (x, x)} are:
shy (ls, es) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
gh
2
if (ls, es) = (x, x)
sˆh,1s if (ls, es) = (x, x)
sˆh,2s if (ls, es) = (x, x)
sˆh,3s if (ls, es) = (x, x)
where
sˆh,1s = min

gh
2
+
Gh
2w
−
Gh
2w(1 + ∆)

, gh

(25)
28As in the case of an only child, it is assumed that the gains from caring, Gl and Gh, are sufficiently
large so that it is beneficial to provide care for aged parents.
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sˆh,2s = min

gh
2
+
Gh(1 + ∆)
2w
−
Gh
2w(1 + ∆)

, gh

(26)
sˆh,3s = min

gh
2
+
Gh(1 + ∆)
2w
−
Gh
2w(1 + ∆)

, gh

(27)
Notice that sh,3s > s
h,2
s T sh,1s > g
h
2
. Child s’s expected payoff from her four pure strategies are:
Es =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
w[m− (1 + ∆)(gl + ρ(0.5gh − gl))] + G˜ if (ls, es) = (x, x)
w[m− (gl + ρ(sˆh,1s − g
l))] + G˜ if (ls, es) = (x, x)
w[m− (gl + ρ(sˆh,2s − g
l))]/(1 + ∆) + G˜ if (ls, es) = (x, x)
w[m− (1 + ∆)(gl + ρ(sˆh,3s − g
l))]/(1 + ∆) + G˜ if (ls, es) = (x, x)
where G˜ = Gl+ρ(Gh−Gl). Under assumption 4, we do not need to consider (ls, es) = (x, x) as a potential equilibrium
strategy of child s since Es(x, x) > Es(x, x). And furthermore, we do not need to consider (ls, es) = (x, x) since
Es(x, x) > Es(x, x). To compare s’s expected payoffs from (ls, es) = (x, x) and (ls, es) = (x, x), suppose that the
parameter values are such that
sˆh,1s = min

gh
2
+
Gh
2w
−
Gh
2w(1 + ∆)

, gh

= gh. (C)
Condition (C) essentially implies that the parameter values are such that if one player (say i) chooses (li, ei) = (x, x)
and player j chooses (lj , ej) = (x, x), then the Nash bargaining solution is a corner solution with child j, who lives
and works at the parents’ place of residence, providing all of the required amount of care.29 It is now straightforward
to check that the action (ls, es) = (x, x) will be a best response to (lf , ef ) = (x, x) if and only if
w
w
≤
2[(m− gl)− ρ(gh − gl)
2m− (1 + ∆)[2gl + ρ(gh − 2gl)]
. (28)
The critical value ω˜ [which is stated in the proposition] now follows immediately.
Now suppose that player f chooses (lf , ef ) = (x, x). Player s’s equilibrium negotiated caregiving shares in period
2 (when k = h) from her four pure strategies are:
ssy(ls, es) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
sˆh,as if (ls, es) = (x, x)
gh
2
if (ls, es) = (x, x)
sˆh,bs if (ls, es) = (x, x)
sˆh,cs if (ls, es) = (x, x)
where
sˆh,as = max

0,

gh
2
+
Gh
2w(1 + ∆)
−
Gh
2w

(29)
sˆh,bs =

gh
2
+
Gh(1 + ∆)
2w
−
Gh
2w

(30)
sˆh,cs = min

gh
2
+
Gh(1 + ∆)
2w
−
Gh
2w

, gh

(31)
29It is straightforward, though somewhat tedious, to show that all our qualitative insights remain the
same in the scenario where the parameter values are such that the Nash bargaining solution is an interior
solution.
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Notice that sˆh,cs > sˆ
h,b
s T g
h
2
> sˆh,as . Child s’s expected payoff from her four pure strategies are:
Es =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
w[m− (1 + ∆)(gl + ρ(sh,as − g
l))] + G˜ if (ls, es) = (x, x)
w[m− (gl + ρ(0.5gh − gl))] + G˜ if (ls, es) = (x, x)
w[m− (gl + ρ(sˆh,bs − g
l))]/(1 + ∆) + G˜ if (ls, es) = (x, x)
w[m− (1 + ∆)(gl + ρ(sˆh,cs − g
l))]/(1 + ∆) + G˜ if (ls, es) = (x, x)
where G˜ = Gl+ρ(Gh−Gl). Under assumption 4, we do not need to consider (ls, es) = (x, x) as a potential equilibrium
strategy of child s since Es(x, x) > Es(x, x). And furthermore, we do not need to consider (ls, es) = (x, x) since
Es(x, x) > Es(x, x). To compare s’s expected payoffs from (ls, es) = (x, x) and (ls, es) = (x, x), notice that under
condition (C) we have that
sˆh,as = max

0,

gh
2
+
Gh
2w(1 + ∆)
−
Gh
2w

= 0. (32)
It is now straightforward to check that the action (ls, es) = (x, x) will be a best response to (lf , ef ) = (x, x) if and
only if
w
w
<
2(m− gl)− ρ(gh − 2gl)
2[m− (1− ρ)(1 + ∆)gl]
. (33)
The critical value ωˇ [which is stated in the proposition] now follows immediately.
Having characterized player s’s best responses in the second stage of period 1, we now turn attention to player
f ’s actions in the first stage of period 1. Suppose first that the parameter values are such
2(m− gl)− ρ(gh − 2gl)
2[m− (1− ρ)(1 + ∆)gl]
<
2[(m− gl)− ρ(gh − gl)
2m− (1 + ∆)[2gl + ρ(gh − 2gl)]
<
w
w
. (34)
Given this set of parameter values, our analysis above shows that child s’s best response to both (lf , ef ) = (x, x) and
(lf , ef ) = (x, x) is to play (ls, es) = (x, x). Condition (C) implies that child f ’s equilibrium negotiated caregiving
shares in period 2 (when k = h) from the two pure strategies (lf , ef ) ∈ {(x, x), (x, x)} would be sˆ
h
f
(x, x) = g
h
2
and
sˆh
f
(x, x) = gh. It thus follows that player f ’s expected payoffs are:
Ef =
8
<
:
w[m− (1 + ∆)(gl + ρ(0.5gh − gl))] + G˜ if (lf , ef ) = (x, x)
w[m− (gl + ρ(gh − gl))] + G˜ if (lf , ef ) = (x, x)
where G˜ = Gl + ρ(Gh −Gl). The action (lf , ef ) = (x, x) will be an equilibrium if and only if
w
w
≤
2[(m− gl)− ρ(gh − gl)]
2m− (1 + ∆)[2gl + ρ(gh − 2gl)]
. (35)
However, given the parameter values under consideration [equation (34)], this is never the case. It thus follows
immediately that when (34) holds, then player f and player s would choose (lf , ef ) = (x, x) and (ls, es) = (x, x)
respectively. This establishes Regions B(3) and B(4) in the result.
Now suppose that the parameter values are such
2(m− gl)− ρ(gh − 2gl)
2[m− (1− ρ)(1 + ∆)gl]
<
w
w
<
2[(m− gl)− ρ(gh − gl)
2m− (1 + ∆)[2gl + ρ(gh − 2gl)]
. (36)
Given this set of parameter values, our analysis above shows that child s’s best response to (lf , ef ) = (x, x) is to
play (ls, es) = (x, x), while her best response to (lf , ef ) = (x, x) is to play (ls, es) = (x, x). Condition (C) implies
that player f ’s equilibrium negotiated caregiving shares in period 2 (when k = h) from the two pure strategies
(lf , ef ) ∈ {(x, x), (x, x)} would be sˆ
h
f
(x, x) = 0 and sˆh
f
(x, x) = gh respectively. It thus follows that player f ’s
expected payoffs are:
Ef =
8
<
:
w[m− (1 + ∆)(1− ρ)gl] + G˜ if (lf , ef ) = (x, x)
w[m− (gl + ρ(gh − gl))] + G˜ if (lf , ef ) = (x, x)
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where G˜ = Gl + ρ(Gh −Gl). The action (lf , ef ) = (x, x) will be an equilibrium if and only if
w
w
≤
(m− gl)− ρ(gh − gl)
m− (1 + ∆)(1− ρ)gl
. (37)
However, given the parameter values under consideration [equation (36)], this is never the case. It thus follows
immediately that when (36) holds, then player f would choose (lf , ef ) = (x, x), and player s would best respond to
this strategy by choosing (ls, es) = (x, x). This establishes part Region B(2) in the result.
Finally suppose that the parameter values are such that
w
w
<
2(m− gl)− ρ(gh − 2gl)
2[m− (1− ρ)(1 + ∆)gl]
<
2[(m− gl)− ρ(gh − gl)
2m− (1 + ∆)[2gl + ρ(gh − 2gl)]
. (38)
Given this set of parameter values, our analysis above implies that child s’s best response to both (lf , ef ) = (x, x) and
(lf , ef ) = (x, x) is to play (ls, es) = (x, x). Condition (C1) implies that player f ’s equilibrium negotiated caregiving
shares in period 2 (when k = h) from the two pure strategies (lf , ef ) ∈ {(x, x), (x, x)} would be s
h
f
(x, x) = 0 and
sh
f
(x, x) = g
h
2
respectively. It thus follows that player f ’s expected payoffs are:
Ef =
8
<
:
w[m− (1 + ∆)(1− ρ)gl] + G˜ if (lf , ef ) = (x, x)
w[m− (gl + ρ(0.5gh − gl))] + G˜ if (lf , ef ) = (x, x)
where G˜ = Gl + ρ(Gh −Gl). The action (lf , ef ) = (x, x) will be an equilibrium if and only if
w
w
≥
2(m− gl)− ρ(gh − 2gl)
2[m− (1 + ∆)(1− ρ)gl]
. (39)
However, given the parameter values under consideration [equation (38)], this is never the case. It thus follows
immediately that when (38) holds, then player f would choose (lf , ef ) = (x, x), and player s would best respond to
this strategy by also choosing (ls, es) = (x, x). This establishes Region B(1) in the result.
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Appendix B: Data and Empirics
Summary Statistics, by Child Type (Germany)
Only Children Firstborn Second born
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Children’s Characteristics:
Age 34.0 9.0 32.2 3.5 28.8 3.4
Female 0.54 0.60 0.54
Year of Birth 1965.7 9.6 1967.4 3.7 1970.8 3.6
Foreigner 0.06 0.07 0.07
East Germany 0.31 0.16 0.14
Married 0.36 0.53 0.32
Dependent Children 0.26 0.45 0.31
Number of Children aged 14 0.37 0.69 0.72 0.89 0.44 0.75
Higher Education 0.33 0.46 0.38
Parents’ Characteristics:
Age of Oldest Parent 64.1 12.2 59.7 6.1 59.7 6.1
Mother is Single† 0.34 0.18 0.18
Parent(s) are Homeowner 0.60 0.74 0.74
Labor Market in Home Region
High Unemployment 0.67 0.63 0.63
Rural Area 0.63 0.68 0.68
Number of observations 279 176 176
†Includes mother is single, divorced, separated or widowed. The table reports the means of the variables
used in the analysis by child type. For non-binary variables, standard deviations are reported as well.
43
